Truth pluralism: a proposal

Abstract

This text defends “plain alethic pluralism” (PAP), a reinterpretation of simple alethic pluralism (SAP), which holds that the term “true” is polysemous but not ambiguous. This polysemy is grounded in a shared focal meaning, defined by three key features: equivalence, minimal correspondence, and normativity. PAP argues that while “true” takes on different context-specific meanings depending on the domain of discourse (e.g., correspondence in science, coherence in mathematics, warranted assertibility in ethics), all such uses derive from a unified focal meaning. Metaphysically, PAP maintains that truth depends on the world, understood as a plurality of domains of states of affairs, each supporting a property relevant to truth that satisfies the focal features. Thus, PAP preserves the conceptual unity of truth while embracing its metaphysical plurality. This allows it to sidestep nihilist objections and offers a coherent and realistic pluralist theory of truth, bridging linguistic practice with ontological commitments through a focal-point-based framework.