Linguistic Putsch and philosophical revolution

Abstract

The aim of this essay is to critically examine, from a Wittgensteinian perspective, the nature of philosophical problems and theories. I show how Wittgenstein's thinking in this respect evolved from an excessively simple diagnosis in the Tractatus (basically, lack of or mistaken adscription of meanings) to a much more complex and sophisticated one (in the Philosophical Investigations) in terms of detailed descriptions carried out by means of a particular conceptual apparatus. With a new conception of language in which the latter is essentially linked to praxis, in the broadest possible sense, Wittgenstein develops a whole series of argumentative strategies which enable him to offer precise diagnoses of concrete philosophical problems. A case in point is the so called ‘private language argument’. An interesting result is that one of the fundamental features of philosophical discourse is its decontextualisation, i.e., the use of language totally disconnected from human activities. I conclude by answering in the affirmative to my two initial questions, namely, whether it is possible to live for centuries in intellectual self-deception and whether one can ignore the movement that frees us from it.